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China’s Approaches to the Western-dominated
International Law: A Historical Perspective from the
Opium War to the South China Sea Arbitration Case
Anlei Zuo*
Abstract:
China’s approaches to international law are an example of nonWestern peoples’ perspectives towards the Western-dominated international law. How has China understood and interacted with the Western-dominated international law since its modern history? This research provides a historical and evolutionary framework for “China
and international law” to reveal China’s approaches to the Westerndominated international law since the Opium War. It finds that China
is historically critical and culturally conservative, and since the Opium
War, it has interacted with the Western-dominated international law in
a reluctant, instrumental and pragmatic way. The research concludes
that the final goal of China’s participation in international society and
interaction with the Western-dominated international law has always
been national rejuvenation. The South China Sea arbitration case illustrates the growing divergences between Chinese perceptions of international law and the Western-dominated international law that result
from clash of ignorance” rather than a “clash of civilizations.” Structural biases and systematic violence of Eurocentrism in the Westerndominated international law and international legal scholarship are integral components of the “clash of ignorance,” and the rise of China
could be an opportunity to rectify them with a more democratic and
balanced approach.

*

Anlei Zuo. PhD, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. Email: zuoanlei2010law@gmail.com.

21

_ZUO_FORMATTED 10-26 (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

10/26/2018 11:37 AM

University of Baltimore School of Law

Introduction
China, a great power in its long history, has been a resistor, taker
and maker of the existing Western-dominated international law since
the nineteenth century.1It is thus analytically representative and methodologically effective to take China’s engagement and interaction with
the existing Western-dominated international legal system as an example for the relationship between “the Rest” and international law. It is
also a unique and significant case study on a potential superpower and
reformer of Western international law in view of the rise of China in
the new millennium.2 More importantly, “China and Western international law” provides an opportunity to historically and critically reexamine the evolution of the Western-dominated international law and
nature of global governance by exposing the structural biases and systematic violence of Eurocentrism in Western-dominated international
law for a more democratic and equitable world order.
There are already many thought-provoking research works on
China and Western international law regarding China’s engagement
and interaction, application and observation, potential challenges and
contributions to Western international legal system since late Qing.3

1.

2.

3.

See, e.g., Patrik K. Meyer, Why China Thinks It Can Build a Utopian World Order, THE
NATIONAL INTEREST, Nov. 23, 2016; See Jacques DeLisle, China’s Approach to International Law: A Historical Perspective, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 267 (2000) In this
paper, the “Western-dominated international law” refers to the current international legal system that has been mostly established and dominated by Western powers, namely,
the Westphalian system; and “international law” also refers to the current international
legal system, unless indicated otherwise. Generally, international law is understood as
“the rules of conduct regulating the intercourse of states.” Thus, there were (and even
still are) different international legal systems in different circles of civilizations, such as
traditional Chines international law within the tribute system in ancient China.).
See John Atkinson Hobson, IMPERIALISM: A STUDY 182 (1902); see Eric A.Posner &
John Yoo, International Law and the Rise of China, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2006) ; see
Barry Buzan, China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?, 3 CHIN. J.
INT’L POLIT. 5 (2010).
See, e.g., Phile C. W. Chan, CHINA, STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER (2015); Phil C.W. Chan, China’s Approaches to International Law Since the
Opium War, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 859 (2014); see Andrew Coleman & Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, “Westphalian” Meets “Eastphalian” Sovereignty: China in a Globalized World, 3 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 237 (2013); Chi-hsiung Chang, A Comparison of Eastern
and Western Principles of International Order: Suzerainty vs. Colonization, 79 BULL.
OF THE INST. OF MOD. HIST. ACAD. SINICA 47 (2013); HANQINXUE, Chinese Contemporary Perspectives on International Law: History, CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2012); RUNE SVARVERUD, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A WORLD ORDER IN LATE IMPERIAL
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Also illuminating are other writings on China’s reception and perception of international law, China’s positive involvement with the international normative system in the Post-Mao Era, China’s pragmatic and
flexible approach to international law in the Spratly Islands dispute,
international law and the rise of China, China’s reform and openingup policy and international law, the application of international law in
Chinese domestic courts, and Chinese observation and practices of international law, etc. are illuminating.4 Moreover, Martti Koskenniemi,
Lauri Mälskoo, and other scholars have provided insightful analyses
and arguments regarding comparative international law.5
It is imperative to historically and critically reexamine the nature
of international law in order to rectify the Eurocentrism in international
law and international legal scholarship. Historical and critical studies
of international law, as well as other studies from the perspective of
international law and language, international law and culture, the sociology of international law, international law and global governance,
international law and international politics, etc. are also enlightening
to comprehend the nature and the evolution of international law.6

4.

5.

6.

CHINA: TRANSLATION, RECEPTION AND DISCOURSE, 1847-1911 (2007); TIEYA WANG,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CHINA: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES (1990).
See Richard S. Horowitz, International Law and State Transformation in China, Siam,
and the Ottoman Empire during the Nineteenth Century, 15 J. WORLD HIST. 445 (2004);
Hungdah Chiu, Chinese Attitudes Toward International Law in the Post-Mao Era, 19781987, 21 INT’L LAW. 1127 (1987); Samuel S. Kim, The Development of International
Law in Post-Mao China: Change and Continuity, 1 J. CHINESE L. 117 (1987); Michael
Bennett, The People’s Republic of China and the Use of International Law in the Spratly
Islands Dispute, 28 STAN. J. INT’L L. 425 (1991); DeLisle, supra note 1; Posner & Yoo,
supra note 2; Congyan Cai, New Great Powers and International Law in the 21st Century, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L.755 (2013); Wang Zonglai & Hu Bin, China’s Reform and
Opening-up and International Law, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 193 (2010); XueHanqin & Jin
Qian, International Treaties in the Chinese Domestic Legal System, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L
L. 299 (2009); Congyan Cai, International Law in Chinese Courts during the Rise of
China, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 269 (2016); Ann Kent, Compliance v Cooperation: China
and International Law, 13 AUSTL. INT’L L. J. 19 (2006); ANN KENT, BEYOND
COMPLIANCE: CHINA, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND GLOBAL SECURITY (2007);
SUPACHAI PANITCHPAKDI & MARK CLIFFORD, CHINA AND THE WTO: CHANGING CHINA,
CHANGING WORLD TRADE (2002); CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: ENTERING
THE NEW MILLENNIUM (Deborah Z. Cass et al., eds., 2003).
See Martti Koskenniemi, The Case for Comparative International Law, 20 FIN. Y.B.
INT’L L. 1 (2009); LAURI MÄLSKOO, RUSSIAN APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2015); see e.g., Anthea Roberts et al., Comparative International Law: Framing the
Field, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 467, 469 (2015).
See, e.g., DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDE OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIANISM (2004); DAVID KENNEDY, A WORLD OF STRUGGLE: HOW POWER,
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However, several research gaps are still there. First, existing research on Chinese and Western international law are far from overcoming the Eurocentrism in international legal studies, or as Dipesh
Chakrabarty puts it, the provincialization of Europe.7 Many writings
are still stagnated in the Eurocentrism and unable to disentangle the
relationship between the existing Western-dominated international legal system and China; studies on “what is international law and what
is international law for” from the perspectives of “the Rest” and “the
Other” are inadequate. Significant topics remain to be elucidated, such
as the inclusiveness of international law as a language and culture of
global governance, and civilizational influences on different approaches to international law.8 Namely, the goal of taking “China and
Western international law” as a case study on the evolution of Western-dominated international law is not fulfilled yet. And second, many
writings are unable to achieve the connection between the historical

7.
8.

LAW, AND EXPERTISE SHAPE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2016); MARTII KOKENNIEMI,
THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 18701960 (2002); MARTII KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (2005); Anne-Charlotte Martineau, The Rhetoric of
Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1 (2009);
MULTICULTURALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF EDWARD
MCWHINNEY (Sienho Yee & Jacques-Yvan Morin eds., 2009); BART LANDHEER, ON
THE SOCIOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (2012) (1966);
RULING THE WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009); THE ROLE OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (Michael Byers ed. 2000); see ANN ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003);
ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2004); GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL
SOVEREIGNS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (2004); B. S. Chimni, International
Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004);
CARLO FOCARELLI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT: THE STRUGGLE FOR
GLOBAL JUSTICE (2012); Gustavo Gozzi, History of International Law and Western Civilization, 9 INT’L COMM. L. REV. 353 (2007); Brett Bowden, The Colonial Origins of
International Law - European Expansion and the Classical Standard of Civilization, 7
J. HIST. INT’L L. 1 (2005).
See DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND
HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE (2008).
See, e.g., UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003). See B. S. Chimni, Asian Civilizations and
International Law: Some Reflections, 1 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 39 (2011); Lauri Mälksoo, The
History of International Legal Theory in Russia: a Civilizational Dialogue with Europe,
19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 211 (2008); Onuma Yasuaki, When Was the Law of International
Society Born? - An Inquiry of the History of International Law from an Intercivilizational Perspective, 2 J. HIST. INT’L L. 1 (2000).
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and critical studies of “China and Western international law” on the
one hand, and the nature and evolution of international law in the world
society on the other hand. Thus, the writings are ineffective and inadequate in understanding the evolution of Western-dominated international law in general and China’s approach to the Western-dominated
international law; particularly in light of the past, present, and the future.
Therefore, the scope and purpose of this research is to focus on
China’s perception and reception of Western-dominated international
law from the Opium War (1839-1842) to the South China Sea arbitration (2013-2016), illustrating the Chinese perspective of history regarding the Western-dominated international law. It endeavors not on
the specific historical or normative analyses, but on providing a framework for “China and Western-dominated international law” to analyze
China’s approaches to the Western-dominated international law. The
research question is: how has China understood and interacted with the
Western-dominated international law since its introduction to China in
the nineteenth century?
The structure of the paper is as follows. After the introduction,
section two focuses on the traditional Chinese international law in ancient China to lay the context of Chinese-Western confrontation of international law. Section three elaborates on China’s approaches to the
Western-dominated international law since the Opium War in the late
Qing, Republic of China (“ROC”) and People’s Republic of China
(“PRC”). Section four takes the South China Sea arbitration case as a
special case study on the contemporary dynamics of China’s approaches to the Western-dominated international law to illustrate the
underlying historical origins and civilizational forces. Section five examines the evolution of both Western-dominated international law and
China’s approaches in view of the rise of China and future of international law. The last part concludes the paper.
Traditional Chinese International Law in Ancient China
Traditional Chinese mechanisms and rules of international relation in ancient “Chinese world order,” several widely acknowledged
and essential conclusions. First, Ancient China had “certain fairly consistent rules and usages” in the interstate conducts (i.e. diplomacy, conferences and treaties) with systematic “usages, words and ideas corresponding to the terms of Western modern international law” from the
25
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Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period (722-221
B.C.) to late Qing.9
Second, compared to the Westphalian system of sovereign states
in Western international law, rules and usages had unique cultural
backgrounds, ethical contexts, political meanings and state inter-relation within the Chinese world order (namely the Sino-centric regional
order).10 Traditional Chinese international law did not contain rhetoric
of “sovereignty equality” or “independent state” but incorporated concepts of “vassal states,” “barbarous state” and “foreign state.”11 The
Relations among participants of this Chinese world order were unique
compared to Western international law.12
Finally, the Chinese tribute and “Eastphalian” state systems, as a
system of rules and governance, were politically legitimate, economically effective and culturally dominant in China and East Asia’s long
history until the intrusion of European states toward the end of the
nineteenth century.13 Traditional ancient Chinese international law is
an extension of Chinese culture and governance with layered hierarchical relations for order and harmony.14 Scholars summarized traditional Chinese world order mainly through sinocentrism and cultural
supremacy, the concept of a universal State, civilization vs. barbarity,
hierarchy and anti-egalitarianism.15 In the words of Benjamin I.
Schwartz, it is “a peculiarly Confucian mystique of rule by virtue and
an absolutization of the Confucian moral order.”16
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.
16.

See L. Oppenheim, International Law 376 (H. Lauterpacht eds., vol. 1,1958), e.g.,
Wang, supra note 3, at 205-207. See Georges M. Abi-Saab, The Newly Independent
States and the Rules of International Law: An Outline, 8 How. L. J. 95 (1962); The
Cambridge History of China 189 (Denis Twitchett & John K. Fairbank eds., 1980). See
Roswell S. Britton, Chinese Interstate Intercourse before 700 BC, 29 Am. J. Int’l L. 616
(1935).
See IMMANUEL C. Y. HSU, CHINA’S ENTRANCE INTO THE FAMILY OF NATIONS 6 (1960).
See ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 10 (1954); ShihTsai Chen, The Equality of States in Ancient China, 35 AM. J. INT’L L. 641 (1941);
Chang, supra note 3; Wang, supra note 3, at 218.
See Chang, supra note 3.
See Coleman & Maogoto, supra note 3 (explaining “Eastphalian” is used in contrast
with Westphalian to define the unique Chinese world order “under the heaven” (“tianxia”)). See ADDA B. BOZEMAN, POLITICS AND CULTURE IN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY:
FROM THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO THE OPENING OF THE MODERN AGE 143 (2d ed.1960).
See China’s Response to the West: Documentary Survey, 1839-1923 19 (S. Y. Teng &
J. K. Fairbank eds., 1963).
See Zhaojie Li, Traditional Chinese World Order, 1 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 20 (2002).
See Wang, supra note 3, at 215-16.
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Compared with Western-dominated international law, how does
traditional Chinese international law differ with respect to global dominance? The governing foundations of traditional Chinese international
law was in the universalization of its culture in the East Asia cultural
circle. Chinese international law was also founded on the recognition
of China’s authority by other countries and people of non-Chinese culture.17 Thus, the use of force was exceptional while cultural ascendancy was the normal Chinese cultural emphasis on morality, order and
harmony, such as “de” (the virtuous conduct), “li” (proper ceremony)
and “fa” (law and regulation), were the main governance foundations.18
Second, the traditional Chinese international law operated on the
basis of the center and dominance of Chinese culture with layered governance framework for order and harmony. The “world order under the
heaven” (“tianxia”) consisted of the “Middle Kingdom” of China
(“zhongguo”) and other subordinated states in the suzerainty system.19
The hierarchical governance structure of traditional Chinese world order had been more cultural and ethical dimensions rather than economic or political dimensions in the kinship family of nations “under
the heaven”.
Third, regarding its governance paradigms, the main components
are diversity, self-determination and non-ruling governance through
the suzerainty system.20 Territorial sovereignty or annexation into the
Middle Kingdom was not vastly sought while self-determination and
the special relationship with the Middle Kingdom were carried out
with cultural subordination and ethical obedience. Order and harmony
in diversity had been one of the fundamental characteristics of traditional Chinese international law and worldview.
Fourthly, regarding the specific governance institutions, the tribute system is the main pillar of the Chinese “world order under the
heaven” (“tianxia”) through cultural subordination, symbolic tributes
17.
18.

19.
20.

Id.
See Jan Zielonka, Empires and the Modern International System, 17 Geopolitics 502,
506 (2012); see also James N. Rosenau, Illusions of Power and Empire, 44 WESLEYAN
U. J. OF HISTORY AND THEORY 73 (2005) (discussing the exceptional uses of force were
violent and even aggressive, which can be considered as the “operation and maintenance
costs” or the dark sides of the traditional Chinese international law in ancient China).
Zhao Tingyang, A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-under-heaven (Tian-xia),
56 Sage J. 5, (2009).
See, e.g., Tingyang Zhao, Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept ‘All-underHeaven’(Tian-xia), 12 SOC. IDENTITIES 29 (2006).
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and economic exchanges.21 No substantial exploitation or conquest had
been performed regularly, as the final goal was the security and cultural authority of the “Middle Kingdom.” That demonstrates the defensive (other than the offensive) strategy of the Middle Kingdom Empire rooted in Chines culture: the final goal is not the extension of
China’s actual ruling or territory but the defensive security of the nation and system.22 This goal is elastic, flexible and open to different
dynasties and at different stages of national strength.23
Fifth, some cultural dimensions of traditional Chinese international law have survived the West-East confrontation and have been
able to embody themselves in the contemporary Chinese culture. These
dimensions have survived despite Western intrusion and subsequent
modernization processes destroying its concrete foundations, structures, paradigms, and institutions. The evolution of Chinese culture,
particularly its worldview and cultural fundamentals, is comparatively
slow in comparison with Chinese revolutions, industrialization and
modernization in the last two centuries.24 Thus, there are many “lines
of continuities” in terms of political system, legal system, social governance, foreign contacts, worldview and international law that form
the domestic and international manifestations of China’s cultural genes
and national identity.25 All those are the domestic and international
manifestations of Chinese culture’s genes and China’s national identity.
Therefore, traditional Chinese international law existed in ancient
China in a legitimate, effective, and dominant relationship from its inception to late Qing (as mechanisms and rules for international

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See IMMANUEL C. Y. HSU, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 182 (Oxford Univ. Press, Inc.,
6th ed. 1975).
See T. F. Tsiang, China and European Expansion, 2 POLITICA 1 (1936); See John K.
Fairbank, Tributary Trade and China’s Relations with the West, 1 J. ASIAN STUD. 129
(1942).
See Yongjin Zhang& Barry Buzan, The Tributary System as International Society in
Theory and Practice, 5 CHINA J. INT. POL. 3, 16-17 (2012).; Yongjin Zhang, System,
Empire and State in Chinese International Relations, 27 REV. INT’L STUD. 43, 53 (2001).
See, e.g., ZHITIAN LUO, INHERITANCE WITHIN RUPTURE: CULTURE AND SCHOLARSHIP IN
EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY CHINA (Brill ed., 2015). See AIGUO LU,CHINA AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY SINCE 1840 (Brill ed., 2000).
See, e.g., KATHRYN BERNHARDT, CIVIL LAW IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA (Stan.
Univ. Press 1994). See PHILIP C. HUANG, CODE, CUSTOM, AND LEGAL PRACTICE IN
CHINA: THE QING AND THE REPUBLIC COMPARED (Stan. Univ. Press 2001).
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relations and exchanges).26 There is no point in mechanical or rigid
analogy (of rhetoric and concepts) between the traditional Chinese international law and Western-dominated international law on the descriptive level. Thus, the Eurocentrism in perceiving traditional Chinese international law should be overcome by ontological and
comparative perspectives towards the traditional Chinese world order
and Western worldview.27
From the perspective of international law as a language and culture of global governance, traditional Chinese international law is an
extension of Chinese domestic governance culture, ideology and
worldview.28 It is a political, cultural and ethical component of traditional Chinese national identity, culture dominance and worldview that
have passed down from ancient Chinese world order all the way to the
twenty-first century’s rise of China.29 Traditional Chinese international law has been subordinated by the thrust of Western forces with
economic exploitation and political oppression. However, but the cultural genes of traditional Chinese international law have been evolving
and functioning covertly in the modernization processes of China, particularly influencing China’s approaches to the Western-dominated international law.30

26.

27.
28.
29.
30.

See ERIC HAYOT, THE HYPOTHETICAL MANDARIN: SYMPATHY, MODERNITY, AND
CHINESE PAIN 10 (Kevin J. H. Dettmar & Mark Wollaeger eds., 2009); PHILIP HUANG,
CIVIL JUSTICE IN CHINA: REPRESENTATION AND PRACTICE IN THE QING (Stan. Univ. Press
1996).
See, e.g., Fassbender & Peters eds., infra note 83.
See Chan, supra note 3, at 864; CHIH-YU SHIH, THE SPIRIT OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY:
A PSYCHOCULTURAL VIEW (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1990).
See, e.g., Suisheng Zhao, Rethinking the Chinese World Order: the Imperial Cycle and
the Rise of China, 24 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 961 (2015).
For instance, the Treaty of Nanking granted an indemnity and extraterritoriality to Britain, the opening of five treaty ports and the cession of Hong Kong Island in 1842. Other
subsequent unequal treaties had forcefully opened China’s market to Western power’
trade system. China’s sovereignty (including territorial integrity, national independence,
tariff autonomy, etc.) had been profoundly undermined, leaving China to be a semicolonial state. See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 282, 284. With the West as the powerful
“Other”, the substantive adaption of the identity of China (as the “Self”) and the governance paradigms of traditional Chinese international law (such as changes in the nondirect governance of Tibet, Vietnam, etc.) has continued from the Opium War in the
nineteenth century to the rise of China in the new millennium.
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China’s Approaches to the Western-dominated International
Law since the Opium War
China is a representative case on the “historical meaning of international law to non-Western peoples.”31 Since the Opium War between
1839-1842, China has been forced into interacting with Western “civilized” powers (including Japan) in accordance with the Western-dominated international law, while traditional Chinese world order and corresponding system of international rules were disintegrating.32
Specifically, the economic interests in Sino-British trade and the conflicts of diplomatic protocols (stemming from different worldviews
and different systems of international law) are the two main underlying
reasons for the Opium War.33 The forced signing of the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842 is the starting point of China’s substantive interaction with
Western-dominated international law in its modern historical processes of endeavoring to save the nation and the people.34
The Opium War marked the start of the so-called “century of humiliation” (“bainianguochi”) for China during 1839-1949, as well as
the start of modern Chinese history.35 More than five hundred “unequal
treaties” were concluded in modern Chinese history, which had intensively encroached on the sovereignty rights of China and public welfare of Chinese people, this includes the ceding or leasing of territories,
forced opening of the ports for trade, imposition of extraterritoriality
on foreigners living in China, large amounts of reparations and loss of
tariff autonomy.36 China’s past isolation and its reluctance to contact
with the West, traditional rules of foreign relations and regional
31.
32.

33.
34.
35.
36.

See Emmanuelle Jouannet, Universalism and Imperialism: The True-False Paradox of
International Law? 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 379, 406 (2007).
Unless expressly stated otherwise in this paper, the “Opium War” refers to the First
Opium War (1839–42), also known as the Anglo-Chinese War. John K. Fairbank, Introduction: the Old Order, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA, VOLUME 10, LATE
CH’ING, 1800-1911, PART 1 1-3 (John K. Fairbank eds., 1978).
See STEVE TSANG, A MODERN HISTORY OF HONG KONG 3-13, 29 (2007). ELIZABETH
COBBS HOFFMAN, AMERICAN UMPIRE 111 (2013).
See Wang, supra note 3, at 238.
See, e.g., Alison Adcock Kaufman, The “Century of Humiliation,” Then and Now: Chinese Perceptions of the International Order, 25 PAC. FOCUS 1 (2010).
See DONG WANG, CHINA’S UNEQUAL TREATIES: NARRATING NATIONAL HISTORY 1–
2(2005). See, e.g., BOLESLAW ADAM BOCZEK, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DICTIONARY 229
(2005); IMMANUEL C.Y. HSU, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 239 (1970); STUART. S,
MALAWER, IMPOSED TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 89-90 (1977); Wang, supra
note 3, at 252-53.
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governance system were constantly defeated and torn apart, while
Western international law were used to justify colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism since the Opium War in the late Qing, Republic
of China [ROC] and People’s Republic of China [PRC].37
Chinese open-minded intellectuals and government officials in the
late Qing who “opened their eyes to see the world” (kaiyankanshijie)
realized that traditional Chinese world order could not cope with the
invasion of the West by modern military force and economic colonization. This is because it had technologically lagged behind due to the
First Industrial Revolution (1760s-1840s) in Europe and China’s great
wall of self-isolation resultant of Sinocentrism, worldview of “Celestial Empire” (tianchaoshangguo) and “Seclusion Policy” (biguansuoguo) in the Qing dynasty.38 Only by learning from the powerful West
(including Japan) and taking advantage of all the existing resources
could the goal of “saving the nation and people” (jiuguobaozhong) be
possibly achieved.39 Thus, reform and modernization by learning from
the West and Japan to preserve the Chinese culture and civilization had
gradually attained widely acknowledged legitimacy through many debates with respect to China’s modern state-building processes, including both domestic affairs and international relations.
Therefore, along with the deepening of China’s engagement and
interaction with Western Powers and the Western-dominated international law since the Opium War, China’s fundamental perspectives and
approaches to the international law have been accumulatively and substantively formed since the late Qing. That is, might is right, and the
Western-dominated international law is the accomplice of political oppression and economic exploitation as a language of power and interests.40 China has to learn from the West in order to take advantage of
the Western-dominated international law to enter into “the family of

37.
38.
39.

40.

See Fairbank, supra note 32, at 3, 6. See, e.g., Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries:
Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L
L. J. 1 (1999). See Anghie, supra note 6.
See Fairbank, supra note 32, at 3.
For example, the renowned intellectual, Qichao Liang, argued about the necessity and
urgency of reform in his famous series of articles titled “General Ideas on Reform”
(bianfatongyi) in 1896-1899. Also, Hongzhang Li, a famous Chinese politician, general
and diplomat in the late Qing, argued for political reform and modernization so as to
preserve the Chinese civilization against invasions of Western powers and Japan.
See Wang, supra note 3, at 248.
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nations” and achieve national rejuvenation to save the nation and the
people.41
Specifically, with respect to its general attitudes, China has been
interacting with the Western-dominated international law in a reluctant, instrumental and pragmatic way since the Opium War. Regarding
its historical engagement, China has taken advantage of the Westerndominated international law in a historically critical and culturally conservative way as a result of its past experiences of political oppression
and economic exploitation. Regarding the continuities and changes of
its participation, China has been a passive resistor, progressive taker
and proactive maker to the Western-dominated international law. The
final goal of China’s participation in international society and interaction with the Western-dominated international law has always been national rejuvenation.42
Specifically, in the late Qing period in 1840-1911, many contacts,
corresponding governmental organs and unequal treaties were established with the West, while the late Qing government was actually still
functioning on the basis of traditional Chinese world order and considered the Western-dominated international law merely as some diplomatic tools to save itself in Sino-West conflicts.43 Therefore, the fundamental conflicts of worldview and governance paradigms (including
specific diplomatic protocols, general principles, etc.) between international law in ancient China (within the tribute system) and the Western-dominated international law (within the Westphalia system) remained unchanged. Such “normative rejection of international law”
was partaken not only by China but also by Western powers so as to
deny China a civilized sovereign state in the “family of nations” and

41.
42.
43.

See, e.g., Yongjin Zhang, China’s Entry into International Society: Beyond the Standard of ‘Civilization’, 17 REV. OF INT. STUD. 3 (1991); Chan, supra note 3, at 77.
See, e.g., Kim, supra note 4, at 128. See Samuel S. Kim, China and the United Nations,
in CHINA JOINS THE WORLD: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 42, 80 (Elizabeth Economy &
Michel Oksenberg eds., 1999); Chan, supra note 3, at 77.
For example, the Zongli Yamen was established in 1861 in charge of foreign policy in
imperial China during the late Qing dynasty. See, e.g., IMMANUEL C. Y. HSU, CHINA’S
ENTRANCE INTO THE FAMILY OF NATIONS, THE DIPLOMATIC PHASE, 1858-1880 121-123
(1960); ARNULF BECKER LORCA, MESTIZO INTERNATIONAL LAW: A GLOBAL
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 1842-1933 114-117 (2014); DOUGLAS REYNOLDS, CHINA, 18981912: THE XINZHENG REVOLUTION AND JAPAN (1993); STEPHEN R. MACKINNON, POWER
AND POLITICS IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA: YUAN SHI-KAI IN BEIJING AND TIANJIN, 19011908 (1980).
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thus realize their goal of political oppression and economic exploitation.44
With the urgent mission of reforming the country and those from
the background of constant military defeats and concessions to foreign
powers since the Opium War, a new form of learning was introduced.
“[L]earning Western science and technology on the basis of Chinese
culture and learning” (zhongtixiyong) was launched during the SelfStrengthening Movement in the 1860s-1890s, despite that it failed by
the defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (jiawuzhanzheng) in 18941895.45 Subsequently, Chinese people were increasingly skeptical towards the traditional Chinese culture and political system.46 With more
Western ideas pouring into societies, this new Western-dominated international law and world order had partially replaced the previous traditional Chinese world order and international law system in both
China and East Asia.47 After the final collapse of Qing dynasty and the
establishment of the ROC in 1912, the Chinese governments and diplomats were determined to enter into the family of “civilized” nations.
This movement was focused on taking advantage of the Western-dominated international law to protect Chinese national interests, despite
that most of the time they failed.48
In the period of the ROC in 1912-1949 and the PRC since 1949,
there may be some changes in the specific approaches to the Westerndominated international law and world order as a result of different
ideologies, governments, etc. However, the main theme of all these
administrations is the same: modern state building, entering into the
family of nations and achieving national rejuvenation for Chinese people.49 Under the context of the First World War, the Beiyang
44.

See Chan, supra note 3, at 868; GERRIT W. GONG, THE STANDARD OF “CIVILIZATION”
164 (1984).
See Wang, supra note 3, at 251; Allen Fung, Testing the Self-Strengthening: The Chinese Army in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, 30 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 1007 (1996).
See, e.g., Charlotte Furth, Intellectual Change: From the Reform Movement to the May
Fourth Movement, 1895-1920, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA, VOLUME 12,
REPUBLICAN CHINA 1912-1949, PART 1 322-405 (John K. Fairbank eds., 1983).
See, e.g., Zhaojie Li, International Law in China: Legal Aspect of the Chinese Perspective of World Order, Thesis (S.J.D.), University of Toronto (Canada) 87 (1996).
For example, at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the Western powers refused
China’s claims and transferred the Germany’s concessions on Shandong to Japan instead.
For example, both the governments support and inherit the Three Principles of the People (nationalism, democracy, and the livelihood of the people) developed by Sun Yat-

IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 146,

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
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government (1913-1928) of the ROC attempted to use the Westerndominated international legal rules to protect its territorial integrity and
other sovereign rights. However, the Beiynag government failed in the
face of power politics, particularly the “Twenty-One Demands” by Japan in 1915.50
Western powers ignored China’s opposition against Japan’s aggression, and Japan’s acquisition of Shandong and other goals were
granted.51 Consequently, China refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles
and the May Fourth Movement was set off in 1919, which contributed
to the Chinese communist movement.52 Chinese people began to reconsider the nature of Western civilization and Western-dominated international law.53 Thus, Chinese government and people were reminded that the Western-dominated international law is nothing but
the tool and accomplice of colonialism, imperialism, international oppression and exploitation, power politics, etc.
Afterwards, the Kuomintang government (1925-1948) of the
ROC led the Chinese people to win the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945). The Kuomintang government succeeded in maintaining that its borders to essentially those of the Qing (minus only
Outer Mongolia) by pragmatic diplomacy and usages of the Westerndominated international law, especially Tibet, Xinjiang and Manchuria.54 However, the hope of abolishing unequal treaties imposed by
Western powers in accordance with the doctrine of rebussic standibus,

50.

51.
52.

53.
54.

sen as part of a philosophy to make China a free, prosperous, and powerful nation. See
LYON SHARMAN, SUN YAT-SEN: HIS LIFE AND ITS MEANING, A CRITICAL BIOGRAPHY 94,
271 (1968).
For example, China invoked Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations to
defend its sovereign rights over the Manchuria against Japan in 1931. Also, China terminated the “unequal treaties” concluded with Belgium in accordance with Article 19
of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the doctrine of rebus sic standibus in
1926.
See SETH P. TILLMAN, ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE
OF 1919 333-34 (2015).
See, e.g., ROCKY M. MIRZA, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE: A REINTERPRETATION OF HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY: 1492-2006 332 (2007); XU
GUOQI, CHINA AND EMPIRE, IN EMPIRES AT WAR: 1911-1923 233 (Robert Gerwarth &
Erez Manela eds., 2014).
See Furth, supra note 46, at 402.
It is also known as “the Second Sino-Japanese War,” as opposed to the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. See William C. Kirby, The Internationalization of China: Foreign Relations at home and abroad in the Republican Era, 150 THE CHINA QUARTERLY
433, 437 (1997); Chan, supra note 3, at 871-72.
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had been frustrated for a long time until the height of the Second World
War (under the context of US’s joining the Allies in 1941) and the
establishment of the PRC, particularly the problem of extraterritoriality and china as a “civilized” sovereign state.55
During the period of the People’s Republic of China from 19491978, China was regarded as a communist threat and enemy to the
Western-dominated world society.56 China’s approaches to international law in the PRC period could be understood through its attitudes
towards the existing world order at that time and foreign policies towards Western countries (especially the US). China’s attitudes and approaches to the Western-dominated international law can be found in
several aspects: the reexamination of previous treaties concluded by
the Kuomintang government and the Qing, “leaning to one side” policy, the doctrines of anti-imperialism, anti-hegemonism, anti-colonialism, “Three Worlds Theory,” “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence,” and support for national independence movement.57
Particularly, the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence” represents China’s most fundamental and significant approach to Western-dominated international law after China’s long way of struggling
in semi-colonial times since the Opium War. The principles include no
humiliation, political oppression or economic exploitation by Western

55.

56.
57.

See, e.g., Harold Scott Quigley, Extraterritoriality in China, 20 AM. J. INT’L L. 46
(1926). See William Callahan, Nationalising International Theory: Race, Class and the
English School, 18 GLOBAL SOCIETY 305, 321 (2004). See Wang, supra note 3, at 248,
261-62. See, e.g., China-United States: Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial
Rights in China and the Regulation of Related Matters. 37 AM. J. INT’L L. 65 (1943).
See GORDON H. CHANGE, FRIENDS AND ENEMIES: THE UNITED STATES, CHINA, AND THE
SOVIET UNION, 1948-1972 (1990).
Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (Adopted
by the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People’s PCC on September 29th, 1949),
Article 55. Namely, it is anti-United States and for the Soviet Union. Between the spring
and summer of 1949, Chairman Mao Zedong advanced three major principles of foreign
policy, including “starting anew,” “putting the house in order before inviting guests”
and “leaning to one side.” For more details, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Formulation of Foreign Policy of New China on the Eve of its
Birth,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18057.
shtml. ZHIYU SHI, CHINA’S JUST WORLD: THE MORALITY OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY 4
(1993). See Sandra Gillespie, Diplomacy on a South-South Dimension: The Legacy of
Mao’s Three Worlds Theory and the Evolution of Sino-African Relations, in
INTERCULTURAL COMM. & DIPL. 123 (Hannah Slavik eds., 2004); Hanqin Xue, Chinese
Observations on International Law, 6 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 83, 85-86 (2007).
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powers towards an independent new China.58 An interesting perspective is that these five principles, specifically the principle of sovereignty, non-aggression and non-interference, have already been alleged as pre-existing fundamental legal principles in the Westerndominated international law, despite that they are merely considered
as formal legal rules (or even rhetoric) in the books rather than in the
actions towards non-Western nations.59 Comparatively, China’s emphasis on the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence” appears to be
more substantive and anti-hegemonism, particularly among different
countries and civilizations during different developmental stages.60
Article 54 of the Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (“CPCPPCC”), which was the provisional constitution from 1949 to 1954, provided as follows:61
The principle of the foreign policy of the People’s Republic of
China is protection of the independence, freedom, integrity of territory
and sovereignty of the country, upholding of lasting international
peace and friendly co-operation between the peoples of all countries,
and opposition to the imperialist policy of aggression and war.
Also, the preamble of the 1954 Constitution of the PRC, which
was the first constitution of the PRC during 1954-1975 based on the
CPCPPCC adopted in 1949, in line with article 56 and 57 of the
CPCPPCC, provided the following: “Our country’s policy of establishing and extending diplomatic relations with all countries on the principles of equality, mutual benefit and respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity has already yielded success and will
continue to be carried out.”62
On the basis of the “World Revolution” approach to the existing
world order in 1965 and the “Three Worlds Theory” firstly raised by
58.

See Chen Tiqiang, The People’s Republic of China and Public International Law, 8
DALHOUSIE L. J. 3, 24-27 (1984); Hungdah Chiu, Communist China’s Attitude Toward
International Law, 60 AM. J. INT’L L. 245 (1966).
59. For example, the United Nations Charter had substantively mentioned all those principles. See, e.g., Anghie,
note 6 (The improvised sovereignty doctrine).
60. See, e.g., THOMAS CIESLIK, THE ROLE OF GREATER CHINA IN LATIN AMERICA, IN
GREATER CHINA IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 161-184 (Sujian Guo & Baogang Guo
eds.,2010); YOUNG-CHAN KIM, CHINA AND AFRICA: A NEW PARADIGM OF GLOBAL
BUSINESS 130-31 (2017).
61. The Common Program of The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, art.
54, Sept. 29, 1949.
62. Id. at art. 56-57.
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Mao Zedongin 1974, Mao’s attitudes towards the West (and even the
whole “Other”) were both radical and conservative, idealistic and realistic, as well as succeeding and negating the previous methods and
experiences.63 That is, ideological concerns, as well as nationalism and
internationalism, were operating simultaneously in the making of
China’s worldview and foreign policies (which was dominated by Mao
in 1949-1976). For example, the “leaning to one side” policy in the
1950s was based on both ideological reasons and realistic concerns of
national interests, while the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s was more
about the leadership of international communist movement.64 On one
hand, the underlying motivations of the evolutionary approach to the
existing world order were ideological concerns, and on the other hand,
institutional and realistic reasons, as the PRC had not participated in
the formulation and design of the existing post-World War II world
order. Moreover, its previous historical experiences during the “century of humiliation” led to substantial political distrust of the West.65
Apparently, China was not only ideologically conservative and
critical towards the existing international legal order (particularly the
imperialism and United States) at that time. It also directly
63.

64.

65.

See People’s Daily, Chairman Mao’s Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds
is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism, Nov. 1, 1977; Chen Jian, China and the
Bandung Conference: Changing Perceptions and Representations, in BANDUNG
REVISITED: THE LEGACY OF THE 1955 ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE FOR INTERNATIONAL
ORDER144-46 (Seng Tan & Amitav Acharya eds., 2008). See, e.g., Li Jie, Changes in
China’s Domestic Situation in the 1960s and Sino-U.S. Relations, in RE-EXAMING THE
COLD WAR: U.S. – CHINA DIPLOMACY, 317-19, 1954-1973 (Robert S. Ross & Changbin
Jiang eds., 2001); Dhruba Kumar, Mao and China’s Foreign Policy Perspectives
(1989); Huiyun Feng, CHINESE STRATEGIC CULTURE AND FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONMAKING: CONFUCIANISM, LEADERSHIP AND WARn47, 59 (2007); Houman A. Sadri,
REVOLUTIONARY STATES, LEADERS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF CHINA, CUBA, AND IRAN 55-57 (1997); Carol Lee Hamrin, Elite Politics and the Development of China’s Foreign Relations, in CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 70-109 (Thomas W. Robinson & David L. Shambaugh eds., 1995).
See, e.g., Frederick C. Teiwes, Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF, vol. 14, The People’s Republic, THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC,
PART 1: THE EMERGENCE OF REVOLUTIONARY CHINA 1949-1965 (Roderick Macfarquhar
& John K. Fairbank eds., 1987); Allen S. Whiting, The Sino-Soviet Split, in THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC, PART 1: THE EMERGENCE OF REVOLUTIONARY 478-538.
See, e.g., Frederick C. Teiwes, Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF, vol. 14, The People’s Republic, THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC,
PART 1: THE EMERGENCE OF REVOLUTIONARY CHINA 1949-1965 (Roderick Macfarquhar
& John K. Fairbank eds., 1987); Allen S. Whiting, The Sino-Soviet Split, in THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC, PART 1: THE EMERGENCE OF REVOLUTIONARY 478-538.
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confrontational and rejective, as the Western-dominated international
law has always been considered as the mouthpiece of hegemonism,
imperialism, international oppression and exploitation towards nonWestern countries due to its low inclusiveness.66 Also, China believed
that it could achieve the goal of national rejuvenation by confrontation
against the existing Western-dominated world order. However, due to
Mao’s revolutionary movements and other policies of ideological confrontation, China had stayed in poverty; and the dream of national rejuvenation had stranded for decades with both traditional Chinese culture and Western-dominated international law stigmatized.67
In October 1971, the PRC government replaced the Taiwan government as the representative government of China in the United Nations (“UN”).68 Despite its continuous hostility towards the UN and
Western-dominated international legal system, such as its non-recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in 1972, China started to gradually engage with and integrate into the Western-dominated international legal order.69
During the period of the PRC since 1978 with the new national
policy of “reform and opening-up,” the focus of Chinese domestic policies changed from “class struggle” to economic development, as it
was believed by the new leaders (especially Deng Xiaoping) that peace
and development (rather than war and revolution) are the major themes
of this era and also the primary needs of China.70 China’s foreign policies have came back to the pragmatic approach of “independent foreign policy of peace,” which includes: (1) safeguarding its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, (2) anti-hegemonism for
world peace, (3) promoting the establishment of a more democratic

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See China Calls Arbitral Court “Mouthpiece” for Certain Groups, XINHUA NEWS (July
4, 2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/04/c_135488172.htm.
See Hungdah Chiu, Communist China’s Attitude toward International Law, 60 AM. J.
INT’L L. 245 (1966).
See G.A. Res. 2758 (XXVI), Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People’s Republic
of China in the United Nations (Oct. 25, 1971).
See Natalie G. Lichtenstein, The People’s Republic of China and Revision of the United
Nations Charter, 18 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 629 (1977); Chan, supra note 3, at 886.
See, e.g., CHINA’S ECONOMIC REFORM: A STUDY WITH DOCUMENTS 80 (Christopher
Howe et al. 2003); Yang Yi, Modernization of China’s National Defense, in
TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN CHINA24142, 1978-2008 (Wang Yizhou eds., 2011).
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and equitable new international political and economic order, and (4)
upholding the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, etc.71
Deng Xiaoping believed that China’s national rejuvenation, particularly economic reform and development for the purpose of “four
modernizations,” could only be achieved within the existing Westerndominated world order and international legal system.72 Therefore, under the guideline of “keep a low profile and achieve something”
(taoguangyanghui, yousuozuowei), China’s goal is to achieve economic and political reform within the framework of Western-dominated world order and international law through general learning from
the West and effective sinicization to the needs of China (with Chinese
characteristics).73 Thus, China’s approach has become pragmatically
taken advantage of existing international law to achieve economic and
political reform for the purpose of national rejuvenation.74
Therefore, China has deeply embraced the Western-dominated international economic order while refusing to comprehensively participate in international human right law, international dispute settlement
by judicial means, international criminal law, and other sensitive areas
of international law. It is evident that China has been still under the
past shadow of “economic exploitation and political oppression” by
foreign powers by virtue of international law as a language of power
and interests.75 To some extent, the independent and peaceful path of
economic development and political reform “with Chinese characteristics” since 1978 is the modified version of the “learning Western science and technology on the basis of Chinese culture and learning”
71.

72.

73.

74.
75.

It is also called China’s “Independent and Peaceful Development Strategy.” See
China’s Independent Foreign Policy of Peace, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (Sept. 19, 2003), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng
/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/zcyjs_663346/xgxw_663348/t24 942.shtml (It is also called
China’s “Independent and Peaceful Development Strategy.”)
The Four Modernizations include the modernization of agriculture, industry, science
and technology, and the military. See Mingjiang Li, Rising from Within: China’s Search
for a Multilateral World and Its Implications for Sino-US Relations, 17 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 331 (2011).
See, e.g., Yan Xuetong, From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement, 153
CHINESE. J. INT. POLIT.184 (2014); Zhu Liqun, CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY: ADAPTATION AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 41-42 (Jinjun Zhao &Zhirui Chen
eds., 2014).
See RICHARD BAUM, BURYING MAO: CHINESE POLITICS IN THE AGE OF DENG
XIAOPING56-57 (1996) (The underlying philosophy is still to learn from the West to save
the nation and the people).
See Kim, supra note 4, at 157.
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(zhongtixiyong) movement in 1860s-1890s, in spite of different contexts and narratives.
Afterwards, different leaders of the PRC would constantly update
and interpret these principles by adopting specific policies and new
concepts in different contexts and for different needs. Some of these
needs include, “China as the largest developing country,” “China’s
peaceful development” and “build a harmonious world,” “China’s core
interests,” “new type of great power relations,” “never seek hegemony,” “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and “Chinese dream,”
“two centennial goals,” “community of shared future for mankind,”
etc.76 The final goal has always been to become a great power to effectively achieve national rejuvenation without direct confrontation with
the West and existing international legal system in accordance with
Deng’s guideline.
In June 2016, Russia and China adopted a declaration on the promotion of international law to “enhance their cooperation in upholding
and promoting international law and in establishing a just and equitable
international order based on international law,” emphasizing the “principles of international law” and criticizing double standards in the
Western-dominated international law.77 This declaration is in line with

76.

77.

See Marcia Don Harpaz, China and the WTO: New Kid in the Developing Bloc?
HEBREW UNIV. INT’L L. 2-07; Xue, supra note 3, at 94, 169, 200; Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, China Issues White Paper on Peaceful Development (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/whitepaper_665742/t856325.shtml; WILLY WO-LAP LAM, CHINESE POLITICS IN THE ERA OF XI
JINPING: RENAISSANCE, REFORM, OR RETROGRESSION? 193-94 (2015). Toshi Yoshihara
& James R. Holmes, Can China Defend a “Core Interest” in the South China Sea?, 34
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY 45 (2011); Qi Hao, China Debates the ‘New Type of
Great Power Relations’, 8 CHINESE. J. INT. POLIT. 349 (2015); Dingding Chen &Jianwei
Wang, Lying Low No More?: China’s New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy, 9 CHINA: AN INT’L J.195, 198 (2011); Zheng Wang, Not Rising, But Rejuvenating:
The “Chinese Dream”, THE DIPLOMAT (Feb. 05, 2013), http://thediplomat.com
/2013/02/chinese-dream-draft/. See, e.g., TIMOTHY R. HEATH, CHINA’S NEW GOVERNING
PARTY PARADIGM: POLITICAL RENEWAL AND THE PURSUIT OF NATIONAL REJUVENATION
218 (2016); H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, Speech at the
United Nations Office at Geneva, Switzerland: Work Together to Build a Community
of Shared Future for Mankind (Jan. 18, 2017), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/201701/19/c_135994707.htm.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion of International
Law (June 26, 2016), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393
/t1386141.shtml.
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previous China-Russia Joint statements in 1997, 2005, 2008, etc.78 As
China and Russia have always considered the existing Western-dominated international legal system as the hegemonic tool with structural
biases for the dominance of the West, it vividly illustrates divergences
and struggles among different approaches to international law by
Western and non-Western powers.79 China has been sticking to the
“Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and adhering to the establishment of a “New International Economic Order” because of its historical sufferings and traditional worldviews.80
There are lines of continuities and changes in China’s approach to
international law from ancient China, late modern China, to the present. Chinese perceptions of the Western-dominated international law
are based on many aspects that are inherited and reinforced as parts of
China’s culture, worldview, history, and national identity.81 China, as
the world’s oldest continuous civilization pushing through thick and
thin, has been evolutionary in its foreign policy, worldview, and culture of governance.82 Understanding the origins and forces in Chinese
culture and history provides a framework for the lines of continuities

78.

79.

80.
81.
82.

See Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation On
Major International Issues, 23 May 2008; Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of
China and the Russian Federation on the International Order of the 21st Century, 1 July
2005; Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on
A Multi-polar World and the Establishment of A New International Order, 23 Apr. 1997.
See Lauri Mälksoo, Russia and China Challenge the Western Hegemony in the Interpretation of International Law, EJIL: TALK! (July 15, 2016), https://www.ejiltalk.org
/russia-and-china-challenge-the-western-hegemony-in-the-interpretation-of-international-law/; see also Ingrid Wuerth, China, Russia, and International Law, L. FARE
BLOG (July 11, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/china-russia-and-internationallaw; Fu Ying & Wu Shicun, South China Sea: How We Got to This Stage, THE
NATIONAL INTEREST (May 9, 2016), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/south-china-seahow-we-got-stage-16118.
See G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), ¶ 4 (May 1, 1974).
See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 287.
See Hobson, supra note 2, at 182; see also Zhao, supra 29, at 962. For example, the
Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, Chinese understandings on the “democratic
deficits” of the Western-dominated international legal system, global governance paradigms, etc., have been important components of Chinese perceptions towards the Western-dominated international law and global governance. Their underlying origins are
from traditional Chinese worldview of “world order under the heaven” (“tianxia”), the
utopian goal of “great peace” (“da tong”), etc. The concept of “Community of Common
Destiny” (“mingyungongtongti”) initiated by President Xi Jinping also demonstrates
Chinese worldview, final goal and global governance paradigms in contrast with Western analogues.
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and changes in China’s approaches to international law since the
Opium War.
South China Sea Arbitration Case: “Yesterday Once More” in
Chinese History of the Western-dominated International
Law
It is always necessary to understand the current situations of international law in the context of the historical evolution (and interaction)
of China and the West in order to formulate general frameworks and
accurate insights of the past, present and future.83 Comparatively, progress in scientific technologies amidst the industrialization and modernization processes could be made in a prompter way than changes in
the culture of nations. It is true that China has made great progress in
industrialization and modernization in the last century (particularly
since 1978), but there is much continuity warranted between the traditional and contemporary China on the cultural aspects of its basic
worldviews and national identity.84 The legal system, particularly international law as the extension of domestic governance culture in a
certain civilization, could illustrate that point.85 This connection and
contextualization are necessary for historical and critical understandings of the contemporary international law and future world order, particularly in light of China’s experiences in its late modern history and
the rise of China in the twenty-first century.86
China’s critical and conservative attitudes towards the Westerndominated international law has always hangs there as the shadow of
the modern history of “century of humiliation.”87 China’s emphasis on
the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, its hostility to international (quasi-) judicial dispute settlement mechanisms, its desire to
learn from the West and also reform the existing Western-dominated
83.

84.
85.
86.
87.

See Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters, Introduction: Towards A Global History Of International Law, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HIST. OF INT’L LAW 1, 24 (Bardo
Fassbender & Anne Peters eds., 2012); Shin Kawashima, China, THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE HIST. OF INT’L LAW 451, 473 (Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters
eds., 2012).
See, e.g., Zhao, supra note 82, at 367.
See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 276.
See G. John Ikenberry, The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal
System Survive?, 87 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 23 (2008); Philip R. Trimble, International Law,
World Order, and Critical Legal Studies, 42 STAN L. REV. 811 (1989).
See Kim, supra note 5, at 157.
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international law system for a more democratic and equitable world
order, etc. have demonstrated China’s fundamental approaches to international law.88 As such, a representative and latest example is the
South China Sea arbitration case in 2013-2016, which vividly illustrates China’s contemporary approach to the Western-dominated international law in the twenty-first century.89
Generally, there are several significant political and legal aspects
of the South China Sea arbitration case. Firstly, China does not recognize the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal in accordance with Annex
VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”) as “the essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is
territorial sovereignty over several maritime features in the South
China Sea.” Despite that, China’s position of non-acceptance and nonparticipation did not bar this Tribunal from proceeding with the arbitration.90Secondly, the arbitration award comprehensively supported
most of the Philippines’s claims and ruled against China with a controversial approach of “progressive and ambitious” interpretation to
relevant clauses, declaring the nine-dash line invalid and even the biggest naturally formed island in Nansha Islands, Taiping Island (Itu
Aba), as no “fully entitled island.”91 Thirdly, the arbitration case is initiated with profound political elements under the context of America’s
“Asia-Pacific Rebalance” Strategy since 2012 and the rhetoric of “the
rise/threat of China” in international politics, and the arbitration award
88.

See, e.g., SOPHIE RICHARDSON, CHINA, CAMBODIA, AND THE FIVE PRINCIPLES OF
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE (2010). See Julian Ku, China and the Future of International
Adjudication, 27 MD. J. INT’L L. 154 (2012); James A. R. Nafziger & Ruan Jiafang,
Chinese Methods of Resolving International Trade, Investment, and Maritime Disputes,
23 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 619 (1987); CHINA AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER
(Wang Gungwu & Zheng Yongnian eds., 2008); William A. Callahan, Chinese Visions
of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?, 10 INT’L STUD. REV. 749
(2008).
89. See Debate Map: Disputes in the South and East China Seas, OXFORD PUB. INT’L LAW,
http://opil.ouplaw.com/page/222/debate-map-disputes-in-the-south-and-east-chinaseas (last updated Mar. 23, 2017).
90. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Position Paper of the
Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South
China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (“China’s Position
Paper”), 7 December 2014, ¶ 4.
Annex VII of the UNCLOS provides that the “[a]bsence of a party or failure of a party to
defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings.”
91. See PCA Case No. 2013-19 of 2016, The South China Sea Arb. ¶¶ 632, 643-48; China’s
Position Paper, supra note 90, ¶¶ 19-22.
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seems to do no good but only bring about chaos to the South China Sea
and Asia.92 Fourthly, many Western countries, such as the US and Australia, pressed China to enforce the arbitration award, while many other
countries are for bilateral negotiations to resolve the disputes.93
There is no doubt that China will not recognize or enforce the
award, and the South China Sea has entered into a new round of bigpower political gambling and geopolitical rivalries, particularly between the US and China.94 The arbitration award is neither a game
changer nor going to have real-world legal impacts due to China’s nonrecognition, but rather another rhetoric in international politics and a
bargaining chip in the grand chessboard.95 International law has exposed its close relationship (or even subordination) to international
politics, as well as the mystery of global governance, the myth of international rule of law, the structural biases of Eurocentrism and low
inclusiveness of the Western-dominated international law, and also
other paradoxes thereof.96 Once again, international law holds a
92.

93.

94.

95.

96.

See Robert S. Ross, The Problem With the Pivot: Obama’s New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive, 91 FOREIGN AFFAIRS70 (2012); Bonnie Glaser & Brittany Billingsley, US-China Relations: US Pivot to Asia Leaves China off Balance, 13
COMPARATIVE CONNECTIONS29 (2011); Eric A. Posner & John Yoo, International Law
and the Rise of China, 7 CHINESE. J. INT’L L. 1 (2006); Barry Buzan, China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible? 3 CHINESE. J. INT’L. POLIT. 5 (2010); Feng
Zhang, South China Sea Arbitration Award: Breathtaking (But Counterproductive), THE
NATIONAL INTEREST (July 16, 2016) http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/southchina-sea-arbitration-award-breathtaking-17004.
See U.S. Dep’t of State, Decision in the Philippines-China Arbitration, (July 12, 2016),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/07/259587.htm.; Australian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Australia Supports Peaceful Dispute Resolution In The South China Sea (July
12, 2016), http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2016/jb_mr_160712a.aspx.; M.
Taylor Fravel et. al., What Is the Future of the South China Sea?, FOREIGN POLICY (July
12, 2016)., http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/12/what-is-the-future-of-the-south-chinasea/.
See Leszek Buszynski, The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and US–China
Strategic Rivalry, 35 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY139 (2012); Jane Perlez & Chris
Buckley, U.S. and Beijing Offer Competing Views on South China Sea, THE NEW YORK
TIMES (June 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/world/asia/us-south-chinasea-talks.html?_r=0.
See Diane Desierto, The Philippines v. China Arbitral Award on the Merits as a Subsidiary Source of International Law, EJIL TALK (July 12, 2016), http://www.ejiltalk.org
/the-philippines-v-china-arbitral-award-on-the-merits-as-a-subsidiary-source-of-international-law/; ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, THE GRAND CHESSBOARD: AMERICAN PRIMACY
AND ITS GEOSTRATEGIC IMPERATIVES (1997).
See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005);
FRANCIS ANTHONY BOYLE, WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1985); EDWIN
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position of powerlessness, perplexity, non-enforcement, crisis of legitimacy and inclusiveness.97 Moreover, the South China Sea arbitration
case is a new layer of these unhappy memories of the Western-dominated international law for China, as the Western-dominated international law has come with humiliation, exploitation and oppression in
terms of “international law’s meaning to non-Western nations and peoples.”98 The Western-dominated international law has not always been
part of the solution, but rather part of the problem.99
Moreover, this arbitration case demonstrates different perceptions
and conceptions of international law by China and Western countries,
which originates from different historical experiences, civilizational
geneses, worldviews, and cultures. On the one hand, China believes
that it has enjoyed the sovereign rights over these islands in the South
China Sea since the Second World War and these rights have been
widely recognized.100 More importantly, these sovereign and historic
rights are exercised by both effective control and Chinese traditional
way of non-ruling governance, and they should be fully respected in a
manner of justice and fairness.101 China considers them as basic historical facts and the Western-dominated international law should not be
intentionally or strategically interpreted to undermine them without
sufficient consideration of the history of the disputes regions and
EGEDE & PETER SUTCH, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE (2013).
97. See Joseph Klein, South China Sea: UN Law of the Sea Arbitration Tribunal Sinks the
Rule of Law, (Aug. 20, 2016), http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2016/08/20/southchina-sea-un-law-of-the-sea-arbitration-tribunal-sinks-the-rule-of-law/; Jacques de
Lisle, The South China Sea Arbitration Decision: China Fought the Law, and the Law
Won. . ..Or Did It?, (July 12, 2016), http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/07/south-chinasea-arbitration-decision-china-fought-law-law-won/.
98. See K. J. Noh, Making a Mockery of International Law: the Arbitral Tribunal on the
South China Sea Prepares the Way for War, (July 19 2016), http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/07/19/making-a-mockery-of-international-law-the-arbitral-tribunalon-the-south-china-sea-prepares-the-way-for-war/.
99. See KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE, supra note 15, at 266-72; FRIEDRICH
KRATOCHWIL, THE STATUS OF LAW IN WORLD SOCIETY: MEDITATIONS ON THE ROLE
AND RULE OF LAW 2(2014); Andrew Hurrell, Global Inequality and International Institutions, 32 METAPHILOSOPHY 34, 43-44 (2001).
100. See generally THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE (Stefan
Talmon & Bing Bing Jia eds., 2014).
101. See Fu Ying, Why China Says No to the Arbitration on the South China Sea, FOREIGN
POLICY, July 10, 2016; China’s Position Paper, supra note 90; Zhiguo Gao & Bing Bing
Jia, The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications, 107
AM. J. INT’L L.98 (2013).
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entitlements.102 Also, as China had issued the jurisdiction exclusion
declaration, nobody should force China into some Western-dominated
proceedings in view of all these humiliations China had endured in the
last two centuries of political oppression and economic exploitation.103
However, on the other hand, a few countries in the ASEAN and some
Western countries behind the scene claim that all these rights are ambiguous and undergoing changes by effective control of islands, the
ratification of the UNCLOS and the evolution of other international
rules.
International legal rules could always be interpreted and argued in
many ways to support totally different (or even contradictory) claims,
to justify or outlaw various conducts; and the existing Western-dominated international law has always been closely related to Western
powers and their interests in its historical evolution from the periods
of colonization, imperialism, and hegemonism, to the contemporary
mystery of global governance and myth of global rule of law.104 To a
great extent, the existing Western-dominated international law is the
extension of Western values and worldviews while alternatives from
other civilizations are suppressed and ignored, and thus the legitimacy
and effectiveness of international law are undermined as a result of its
inclusiveness and representativeness deficits.105 It has been happening
in Africa, Middle East, South China Sea and many other places that
the Western-dominated international law has not been the tool for
global justice or the solution to global governance dilemmas, but the
reinforcer of the existing structural biases or part of the systematic violence.106
It goes to the heart of the fundamental question: what is the Western-dominated international law and what is the Western-dominated
international law for? From the perspective of historical and critical
102. See Alan E. Boyle, Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problems
of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction, 46 INT’L & COMP. L. Q.37 (1997).
103. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 288, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397.
104. See Simpson, supra note 6; Focarelli, supra note 6, at 4.; Tom J. Farer, Political and
Economic Coercion in Contemporary International Law. 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 405 (1985);
Anghie, supra note 6, at 32.
105. See Brzezinski, supra note 95, at 24-29.
106. See David Kennedy, Law and the Political Economy of the World, 26 LEIDEN J. INT’L
L.7 (2013) (The inequality and injustice in the international political and economic life
are the creature of international law).
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studies of international law, these are glimpses of the dark sides of the
Western-dominated international law since its inception.107 That’s why
it should not be defined as the “clash of civilizations” but the “clash of
ignorance.”108 That is, the structural biases of Eurocentrism and ignorance in international law give rise to the systematic violence of global
governance and struggles of non-Western people.
China’s approaches to international law have been a representative part of that grand story. For instance, China’s hostility to international judicial mechanisms comes from: (1) its historical experiences
of the dark sides of international law, (2) its belief in justice and fairness in the naturalism rather than the legal positivism of international
law; and (3) its traditional desire of order and harmony in Asia through
non-Western non-judicial manners.109 The existing Western-dominated international law is considered by many non-Western nations,
particularly China, as the legal tool for the pursuit of interests in international politics, the language of Western values and worldviews, and
an integral part of the culture of Western-dominated governance

107. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law–20 Years Later, 20 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 7 (2009). Kennedy, THE DARK SIDE OF VIRTUE, supra note 6; Orford, READING
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 6.
108. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 73 COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS 22 (1993); Edward W. Said, The Clash of Ignorance, THE NATION, October
22, 2001, at 1; Karim H. Karim & Mahmoud Eid, Clash of Ignorance, 5 GLOB. MEDIA
J. – CAN. ED.7 (2012). (“The clash of ignorance provides a critique of the clash of civilizations theory by addressing the particular problem of ignorance in intercultural and
international interactions. It challenges the assumption of the Self and the Other, and it
argues that the causes of global governance dilemmas “are not to be found in an unavoidable clash of civilizations but in ignorance”. Namely, the “clash of civilizations”
theory and other similar scholarship are abstract and constructed distortion of the reality,
which are detached from the reality and ineffective to describe, analyze and critique the
reality. The power-knowledge co-production entrenches structural biases and systematic
violence into the scholarship to main the structural biases (power, interests and injustice)
in global governance. This “clash of ignorance” critique could also apply to international
law and international legal scholarship to reveal the structural biases thereof. And those
dark sides of international law, structural biases in international legal scholarship, etc.,
have been pointed out by many other critical studies of international law.).
109. See Michael D. Swaine, Chinese Views on the South China Sea Arbitration Case between the People’s Republic of China and the Philippines, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CLM51MS.pdf.; Institute for Security & Development Policy, Understanding China’s Position on the South China Sea Disputes, BACKGROUNDER, (June
2016), http://isdp.eu/publication/understanding-chinas-position-south-china-sea-disputes/; China’s Position Paper, supra note 90.
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paradigms.110 The myth of “international rule of law” seems to be the
rule of Western-dominated international law for Western-dominated
global governance paradigms.111
The South China Sea arbitration case reveals different historical
narratives of Western-dominated international law, different imagination of global governance and different ideas of world order. The arbitration case also exposes the ignorance and struggles that “the Rest”
have endured from the West in terms of the structural biases and systematic violence of Eurocentrism in international law and international
legal expertise. It subtly unfolds the ignorance and structural biases in
existing international legal scholarship, particularly the blind spots on
the dark sides of Western-dominated international law and overstatements of its nobility. This arbitration case provides a good critique on
expansionist arguments and progressive narratives of the Westerndominated international law in view of the historical expansion of European international law.112 Different narratives of history, diverse imagination of orders and worldviews, and disparate language and culture
of global governance are more fundamentally significant than technical and legal debates within the legal positivism of international law
in the South China Sea arbitration case.
The South China Sea arbitration case illustrates the conflicts between Chinese perceptions of international law and the Western-dominated international law since the Opium War.113 China’s approaches
to international law are based firstly on its traditional worldview and
culture (particularly the beliefs in naturalistic justice and fairness, and
desire of order and harmony through non-Western non-judicial manners), and secondly on its historical experiences with the Westerndominated international law. China has been conservative towards
110. See Monica Garcia-Salmones Rovira, The Project of Positivism in International Law,
25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 599, 602 (2014) (book review).; Steven R. Ratner, The Thin Justice
of International Law: A Moral Reckoning on the Law of Nations, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L.
1169, 1170 (2015) (book review).
111. See DAVID KENNEDY, The Mystery of Global Governance, in RULING THE WORLD?:
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 51 (Jeffrey L.
Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009); FRANK J. GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY, AND
JUSTICE: TOWARD A LIBERAL THEORY OF JUST TRADE (Martinus Mijhoff, 1st ed. 2003).
112. See Jochen von Bernstorff, International Legal Scholarship as a Cooling Medium in
International Law and Politics, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L.977, 989 (2014).
113. See Li Chen, Universalism and Equal Sovereignty as Contested Myths of International
Law in the Sino-Western Encounter, 13 J. HIST. INT’L. L. 75 (2011).

48

_ZUO_FORMATTED 10-26 (DO NOT DELETE)

10/26/2018 11:37 AM

ILS Journal of International Law

Vol. VI, No. 1

Western-dominated international law as a result of international law’s
dark sides and lack of inclusiveness. The divergences among different
perceptions of current Western-dominated international law are very
likely to increase.114 Thus, current Western-dominated international
law and global governance paradigms are undergoing potential crises
of legitimacy and effectiveness due to the Eurocentrism and “clash of
ignorance.” The South China Sea arbitration case is a scene of “yesterday once more” in Chinese history.
The Rise of China and the Future of International Law
The existing international legal system has inherited much from
colonialism, imperialism, hegemonism, etc. in a close and continuing
historical relevance of the past.115 The history and contemporary evolution of international law are woven into the same narratives, discourse, knowledge, language and culture of international law, global
governance and international legal scholarship.116 International law is
utilized to name and rename, mythicize and re-mythicize, to make law
and to outlaw. Doing so realizes various economic and political interests in a globalized but still decentralized world society.117 The evolution of China’s approaches to international law since the Opium War
has gone hand in hand with the evolution of the Western-dominated
international law in terms of both its noble goals and dark sides.118
Western-dominated international law takes “interest” in the central concept of international cooperation and competition (while justice
and morality) are disregarded. Legal positivism assumes that international law, as a normative vision of the world society and as a
114. See Routledge, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD (Matthew Happold ed.,
2012).; Bobo Lo, RUSSIA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (Brookings Inst. ed., 2015).; THE
EMERGING POWERS AND THE EMERGING WORLD ORDER: BACK TO THE FUTURE? (Steen
Fryba et. al. eds. 1st ed. 2016).; Barry Buzan, China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful
Rise’ Possible?, 3 CHINESE J. OF INT’L POL. 5, 12 (2010).
115. See Anghie, supra note 6.
116. See KENNEDY, A WORLD OF STRUGGLE, supra note 6, at 199; Samuel Moyn, Knowledge
and Politics in International Law, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2164 (2016); SHEILA JASANOFF,
THE IDIOM OF CO-PRODUCTION, IN STATES OF KNOWLEDGE: THE CO-PRODUCTION OF
SCIENCE AND SOCIAL ORDER 1 (Sheila Jasanoff eds., 2004).
117. See Focarelli, supra note 6, at 4.; Simpson, supra note 6.; KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE
CIVILIZER OF NATIONS, supra note 6, at 516-17; See Koskenniemi, FROM APOLOGY TO
UTOPIA, supra note 15, at 562-617.
118. See Fassbender & Peters eds., supra note 83; Kennedy, A WORLD OF STRUGGLE, supra
note 6.
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normative language for international discourse, could apolitically report the reality of world society. However, due to ideological and structural biases in international law and international legal expertise, it
cannot.119 Positivism in international law leads to the following consequences: the detachment of law from reality, elimination of politics
from law, and definitive transformation of law into a tool at the service
of interests.120
The positivism of international law ignores the reality of the world
society and the evolution of international law in this world society.
Thus, these ideological and structural biases inherited from imperialism and other dimensions of the Eurocentric history of international
law are covered up.121 The positivism of international law facilitates
the embellishment of the Eurocentric history of international law. Further positivism hides these biases to maintain the effectiveness, legitimacy and dominance of the contemporary Western-dominated international legal system and global governance paradigms. These
ideological and structural biases are woven into the positivism of international law and reinforced by the Eurocentric narratives of the history of international law. International law has never apolitically reported on and responded to the reality of the world society.122
If the science of international law, the normativity and positivism
of international law, are not able to accurately respond to reality said
law and legal scholarship become artificial rhetoric in close connection
with power, interests and politics. The seemingly productive, systematization of international law and enhanced legitimacy of the Westerndominated international law reinforces international law to be a tool
for international exploitation and dominance by some countries.123 The
result is injustice and conflicts in world society more injustices, imbalances and potential conflicts in this world society as structural biases

119. See Thomas Pogge, Divided against Itself: Aspiration and Reality of International Law,
in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INT. L. 373 (James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi
eds., 2012).
120. See Rovira, supra note 110, at 603.
121. See Kratochwil, supra note 99.
122. See Rovira, supra note 110, at 604.
123. See HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2002).; Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: The
“Real” History of Free Trade, Foreign Policy In Focus (2003).
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and systematic violence are not removed but reinforced.124 Therefore,
it is imperative to put the Western-dominated international law back
into the broad historical context for a holistic and meaningful geology
of international law, as historical and critical studies of international
law are beneficial to achieve “a politically and historically informed
account of the role of international law.”125
Many analytical concepts and tools are used to illustrate the nature
and evolution of the current Western-dominated international law and
global governance.126 Deconstructing these assumptions and the
knowledge-power production system in international law and international legal scholarship gets ride of structural biases and systematic
violence.127
For instance, the perspective of the legitimacy of the current Western-dominated international law and global governance touches upon
a fundamental question about the evolution of international law: international institutions and rules should constantly evolve to response to
the changing needs in this world society where sovereign states are still
the principle actors; otherwise, they will decay by causing disorder,
costs and risks as a result of the decline of their legitimacy.128 However,
how does international law realistically evolve, and why? Whose order
and disorder, benefits and burdens, justice and injustice, development
and exploitation in the evolutionary processes? Who decides and how
to decide the center and the peripheries of the projected structure of
international law and global governance?129 These issues lead us to
more insights on the sociology of international law.
124. See Rovira, supra note 110, at 602-03; Thomas Pogge, Priorities of Global Justice, 32
METAPHILOSOPHY 6 19-21(2001).
125. See James Crawford &Martti Koskenniemi, Introduction, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (James Crawford &Martti Koskenniemi eds.,
2012).
126. See FRANK J. GARCIA, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THREE
TAKES 12 (2013). See also LEGITMACY, JUSTICE AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Lukas H. Meyer ed., 2009).
127. See DAVID MILLER, NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 20 (2007). For
“connected criticism,” See Michael Walzer, The Political Theory License, 16 ANN. REV.
OF POL. SCI. 1, 5 (2013). See Kratochwil, supra note 99 (H. Meyer ed., 2009).
128. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY: FROM THE
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY (2014).
129. See THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONSIDERING
SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY AND SUBSIDIARITY (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds.,
2008).
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Also, the global justice approach to international law effectively
facilitates to take account of these injustices, imbalances and biases in
the current realities of international rule of law.130 There is no fundamental incompatibility between global justice and international law,
except that these structural biases in the current international legal system embody a Western-dominated paradigm of morality and justice in
international law and global governance, particularly the legal positivism of international law.131 However, all these biases and violence
seem to be inevitable and fated, as the Western-dominated international law has always been predominant actors’ tool for interests and
power in the last several centuries.132
From the perspective of international law as a language and culture of international cooperation and global governance, the nature and
operation mode of the current Western-dominated international law
would not change until the power structure transforms, and then a new
mode of language and culture of international law comes into being
with potentially different focuses and achievements. Only when a new
theoretical framework is initiated and integrated into current international legal practices and theories could it be possible to mitigate these
structural biases and systematic violence. To that point, the multi-polarization trend, particularly the rise of China, may provide opportunities to break away from the age-old Eurocentrism and finally have a
truly global base for international law and global governance.133
As pointed out by Hoebel, “law is but a response to social
needs.”134 That is more than true for international law in a world society.135 International law is one form of social norms with the merit of
stability and predictability to regulate the interfaces and exchanges
among nations, and it is a legalized form of regulatory and distributive
mechanisms with sovereignty elements and transnational factors.136

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See Garcia, supra note 111.
See Ratner, supra note 110.
See Garcia, supra note 126, at 20.
Id. at 14.
See E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE
LEGAL DYNAMICS 293 (2009).
135. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
437 (1933).
136. See Byers eds., supra note 8, at 252-54; WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (1964); Onuma Yasuaki, International Law in
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Now, the fabric of the international community and the solidarity of
the world society are aggressively established, while “the consciousness of the entity of the whole” in a world society is driven by diverse
interests with different cost-benefit analyses in reality.137
The current Western-dominated international law is a language of
power and interests in the name of normative rules, which manifests
the Western culture of global governance. From the perspective of the
colonization of life world by systems in Habermas’s “Theory of Communicative Action,” these structural biases and systematic violence
manifest the colonization of the interests (money) and power in international political and social system onto international law as a communicative language, as well as their colonization onto international
legal scholarship as a medium for social reflection.138 Also, from the
perspective of “the West and the Rest” dichotomy, these structural biases in international law and international legal expertise are entrenched in the civilizing mission and colonial confrontation with the
dominance of the West over the rest.139
Furthermore, the power-knowledge co-production paradigm for
the structural biases in international legal scholarship could produce
vicious circles in global governance. Firstly, the structural biases in
international legal expertise would facilitate and reinforce the structural biases in international law and the dominance of the West for
some time, by constantly excluding and oppressing non-Western powers and knowledge. Secondly, the first step leads to new powers and
knowledge being excluded in the existing communities, and establishing separate portals by regime proliferation and rule complexity becomes a cost-effective option for emerging powers. Thus, the effectiveness and legitimacy of the existing Western-dominated
international law and knowledge will be diluted. Thirdly, not until the
cost-benefit analysis of this sort of interaction goes against the predominant West does the reformulation of these communities start.
Hence, the governance and transaction costs for these proliferation,
complex and disorders could be substantial. However, that is the nature

and with International Politics: The Functions of International Law in International
Society, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 105, 108 (2003).
137. See Friedmann, supra note 136, at 57. (“[A] community of interests”).
138. See JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1981).
139. See NIALL FERGUSON, CIVILIZATION: THE WEST AND THE REST (1981); EDWARD W.
SAID, ORIENTALISM (1979).
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of power politics and diplomacy in a Western-dominated world society.
Then, what kinds of impacts will China’s approaches to the Western-dominated international law and the rise of China have on the evolution and future of international law in this globalized, multipolar and
decentralized world society? Generally, changes to international legal
rules and regimes are gradually achieved through regime proliferation,
rule complexity and thereafter their interaction.140 Changes are based
on existing rules and regimes, and new stakeholders need to cooperate
with previous dominant authorities.141 Thus, any overall overthrow of
existing structure of interests in international law is not feasible. A
more interdependent world system does not mean the decline of the
past powers and the rise of new hegemonies, but means more pillars
and stakeholders for better balance of interests in global governance
and enhanced legitimacy of international law.142
Therefore, on the one hand, China will continue its constructive
engagement within the current international legal system in the short
term, trying to make a difference in the system.143 On the other hand,
China will make efforts to establish China-led regional mechanism in
the Asia-Pacific region and then reform the current global order on the
long run by introducing new contents, paradigms and connotations
from its civilization to the language of international law and culture of
global governance.144 Namely, it is the implementation of the strategy
of “keep a low profile and achieve something” (taoguangyanghui,
yousuozuowei) and “learning Western science and technology on the
basis of Chinese culture and learning” (zhongtixiyong).145 More importantly, China’s approaches to international law and the rise of China
could be an opportunity to rectify these structural biases and systematic

140. See Kal Raustiala, Density and Conflict in International Intellectual Property Law, 40
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Initiative, 47 CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR 1 (2015); Stephen M. Young, US -China
Relations: Balancing Cooperation and Competition in the Most Important Bilateral Relationship in Both the Region and the World, 37 AM. FOREIGN POL’Y INTERESTS 166
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violence in the current Western-dominated international law with a
more democratic and balanced approach, if “a more democratic and
balanced approach” partly means more invoices and interests of main
stakeholders are taken into consideration.
In conclusion, the structural biases and systemic violence of Eurocentrism in the current Western-dominated international law and international legal scholarship are integral components of “the clash of
ignorance” amidst the evolution of international law in this globalized
but decentralized world society. The rise of China could be an opportunity to rectify these structural biases and systematic violence in the
current Western-dominated international law with a more democratic
and balanced approach.
Conclusion
The era of the unchallenged centrality of Europe and the West, as
well as the Chinese traditional world order, is now in the past. However, far from the end of the story, a new stage has been set for the
participation and competition of different civilizations in global governance and international law. One of the greatest challenges to international law and international politics is still the lag in the evolution of
international institutions behind social needs and changes in this world
society.146
From the Opium War to the South China Sea arbitration case, traditional Chinese international law and world order have always been
evolving and functioning covertly, along with growing divergences between Chinese (perceptions of) international law and the Westerndominated international law as a result of the clash of ignorance. The
future of international law lies in historical and critical reflections of
the current injustice, imbalances, structural biases and systematic violence from the perspective of both the Self (the West) and the Other
(the Rest); and, the rise of China is likely to restructure the inclusion
and exclusion on the economic and political levels in international law.
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